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Competing Partisan Regimes and
the Transformation of the Voting
Rights Act, 1965-2015
Jesse H. Rhodes
1 On June 25, 2013, in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, the Supreme Court struck down the
coverage formula determining which states must submit proposed changes to voting
rules or election systems to the Department of Justice (DOJ) or the federal courts for
“preclearance” under the 1965 Voting Rights Act (VRA). In a 5-4 decision, the Court
ruled that the existing coverage formula failed to take account of improvements in race
relations  in  jurisdictions  required  to  submit  their  plans  for  preclearance,  and thus
imposed  an  undue  burden  on  these  areas.  As  the  majority  decision  announced,
Congress’s failure to improve the VRA “leaves us today with no choice but to declare
§4(b)  unconstitutional” (United States Supreme Court 2013:24).  While the Court left
open the possibility that Congress could construct a coverage formula that would pass
constitutional muster, intense partisan polarization makes it extremely unlikely that
Congress will devise a suitable coverage formula anytime soon. Indeed, Democrat-led
efforts to resurrect the coverage formula in 2014 and 2015 were stymied by vociferous
Republican opposition (Rutenberg 2015). 
2 The decision was widely viewed as a major blow to enforcement of minority voting
rights,  because  it  freed  previously-covered  states  to  institute  stringent  voting
regulations  –  such  as  “voter  I.D.”  laws  that  require  prospective  voters  to  present
government-issued photo identification cards in order to gain admittance to the polls -
that  weigh  heaviest  on  disadvantaged  groups.  Immediately  following  the  decision,
several  southern  states,  including  Texas  and  North  Carolina,  moved  to  implement
restrictive voting laws that are expected to aversely affect political participation by
African  American,  Hispanic,  and  young  voters.  The  Obama  administration  has
challenged these initiatives in federal court, but the case-by-case litigation required by
Shelby  County  has  clearly  shifted  the  political  and  legal  advantage  to  opponents  of
vigorous federal enforcement. 
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3 Strikingly, the Shelby County decision came just a few years after Congress voted by an
overwhelming margin to reauthorize the VRA with only modest changes until 2031.
Indeed, during oral arguments proponents of federal preclearance pointedly noted – to
no  avail  –  that  in  2006  Congress  had  explicitly  concluded  that  “without  the
continuation of the [VRA’s] protections, racial and language minority citizens will be
deprived of the opportunity to exercise their right to vote, or will  have their votes
diluted,  undermining the significant gains made by minorities in the last  40 years”
(Holder  et  al  2013:5).  In  light  of  this  recent  legislative  history,  the  Court’s  actions
entailed a direct challenge to Congress’s authority to safeguard minority voting rights
under  the  Voting  Rights  Act  and  the  Fifteenth  Amendment  to  the  United  States
Constitution. 
4 What accounts for the peculiar pattern of legislative support and judicial indifference
(or  hostility)  that  characterize  the  politics  surrounding  the  VRA  today?  How  have
patterns  of  stability  and  change  in  voting  rights  policymaking  related  to  broader
partisan and institutional struggles? This article examines the “strange career” of the
Voting  Rights  Act  (Kousser  2008)  through the  lens  of  historically-oriented  political
science, linking the evolution of the federal voting rights regime to broader
developments in national party politics. The apparent disjuncture between the broad
congressional support for the 2006 reauthorization and the Supreme Court’s hostility
to the Act in 2013 is just the most recent incidence of a longstanding political pattern
with deep roots in partisan battles over racial equality. Indeed, the enduring tensions
between the progressive tenor of the statute, on one hand, and the conservative gloss
attributed by the Supreme Court (and frequently the executive branch) derive from the
way partisan conflict over racial equality has been mediated by the nation’s political
institutions. 
5 The VRA was enacted during a period of liberal Democratic dominance in American
politics. Along with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the VRA helped establish a “norm of
racial  equality”  (Mendelberg  2001)  in  which  African  Americans  and  other  racial
minorities were to be treated as equals. Many Democratic constituencies – especially
civil rights activists, liberal intellectuals, and labor groups - hoped that the VRA would
pave the way to “race-conscious” policies that would enhance the power of the federal
government to combat racial inequality (King and Smith 2005; King and Smith 2008).
From the late 1960s onward, however, Democrats faced increasing competition from a
new  partisan  regime  organized  around  conservative  Republican  principles  of  free
markets, limited government, and “color-blind” racial policymaking that rejected race-
targeted measures. 
6 While  the  rising  Republican  regime  enjoyed  great  success  in  presidential  politics
between 1968 and 2008, it failed to secure long-term control of Congress. Consequently,
it has lacked the authority to achieve a significant legislative weakening of the VRA. In
truth, because they were anxious to avoid the appearance of hostility to the norm of
racial  equality  in  high-profile  legislative  debates  over  reauthorization of  the  VRA’s
provisions,  Republicans  repeatedly  acquiesced to  progressive  extensions  of  the  Act.
After losing legislative battles, however, conservative Republican presidents turned to
the courts and the bureaucracy, which offered opportunities for limiting the scope of
the  VRA  without  the  need  for  legislation  requiring  bipartisan  approval.  Such
“subterranean”  judicial  and  administrative  maneuvers  (Hacker  2004)  also  allowed
conservative  Republican  officials  to  circumscribe  the  Act  while  at  the  same  time
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maintaining  the  public  appearance  of  fidelity  to  the  norm  of  racial  equality.  This
political  dynamic  gave  rise  to  the  bifurcation  of  voting  rights  politics,  in  which
legislative  enactments  often  marched  in  the  opposite  direction  of  administrative
decisions and judicial rulings. 
7 The broader implications of this study are troubling. The gradual enervation of the
federal voting rights regime in the face of well-documented evidence of ongoing racial
discrimination in voting opportunities (McDonald and Levitas 2006; Katz et al  2006)
portends the further diminution of the right to vote. The fact that unelected judges and
administrators  have  played  the  central  part  in  this  drama  suggests  that  this
development  is  undemocratic,  because  those  ultimately  responsible  cannot  be  held
accountable  for  their  decisions.  Whether  these  setbacks  in  the  “unsteady  march”
(Klinkner and Smith 1999)  toward racial  equality  can be reversed remains an open
question.
 
Partisan Regimes and the Development of the VRA 
8  This article examines the development of the VRA from 1965 to the present through
the lens of contending partisan regimes (Ackerman 1991; Plotke 1996; Skowronek 1997;
Polsky  2001,  2012).  Broadly  understood,  a  partisan  regime  is  “a  political  coalition
organized under a common party label that challenges core tenets of the established
political order, secures effective national governing power, broadly defines the terms
of political debate, and maintains sufficient power to thwart opposition efforts to undo
its  principal  policy,  institutional,  and ideological  achievements”  (Polsky  2012:57).  A
partisan regime is comprised of officeholders and the party organization, along with
allied  organized  interests,  social  movements,  and  public  intellectuals.  Usually
ascending to power in the wake of a major crisis, a new partisan regime attempts to
address  the  problems  facing  the  nation  by  uprooting  the  discredited  ideology  and
programmatic commitments of the previous governing arrangement, paving the way
for novel solutions to the challenges at hand (Plotke 1996). A successful partisan regime
“reconstructs” American politics (Skowronek 1997), fundamentally altering governing
commitments,  transforming  public  policies,  and  reordering  social  relationships.
Furthermore, by “stabiliz[ing] and routini[zing] governmental operations around a new
set  of  political  assumptions” (Orren and Skowronek 1999:693),  a  successful  partisan
regime  insulates  its  achievements  against  the  vagaries  of  future  political  struggles
(Milkis 1993). 
9  The concept of the “partisan regime” is a useful heuristic for thinking about party-
based programmatic change (Polsky 2012). In practice, however, events rarely conspire
to  endow  a  rising  partisan  regime  with  the  authority  to  wholly  recast  governing
commitments (Orren and Skowronek 1999; Lieberman 2002). Indeed, “[t]he American
constitutional  system  was  designed  to  forestall  the  very  accumulation  of  power
resources that a partisan coalition finds useful in the pursuit of its agenda and the
preservation  of  its  control”  (Polsky  2012:58).  The  Constitution  created  a  highly
fragmented political system, with political power divided both vertically between the
national  government  and the  states,  and horizontally  between the  presidency,  two
separately-elected houses of Congress, and the judiciary. Thus, when a new partisan
regime gains influence, political forces opposed to the ascendant order work to exploit
the  decentralized  character  of  political  power  in  American  politics,  attempting  to
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occupy sites of authority – the bureaucracy, the federal courts, state governments, and
so forth - to obstruct the ascendant regime’s reconstructive efforts when and where
they  can (Baumgartner  and Jones  1993).  Furthermore,  popular  ideological
commitments are usually difficult to dislodge entirely, meaning that opponents to a
rising partisan regime can continue to make ideological appeals that will resonate with
a broad audience.
10  Further complicating matters is the fact that rising partisan regimes increasingly face
the problem of “institutional thickening” (Skowronek 1997) – that is, the accretion of a
diverse array of professionalized interest groups, advocacy organizations, attorneys,
experts, and media conglomerates with investments in the status quo. These groups
possess  resources  they can use  to  obstruct  thoroughgoing partisan transformations
(Hacker 2004; Teles 2008). The progressive thickening of the organizational universe
has added an additional layer of obstacles to the whole-scale restructuring of American
politics (Laing 2013). 
11  Because antagonistic forces remain in positions of political power within the system,
partisan regime-builders must make concessions to their opponents in accomplishing
their objectives (Orren and Skowronek 1999:696). These accommodations delimit – and
may even redirect – new reform drives. The leaders of an ascendant partisan regime
may find their preferred courses of action stymied by their opponents, forcing leaders
to pursue alternate routes to the realization of their objectives. Equally important, the
persistence of ideologies contrary to the rising regime might constrain regime leaders’
capacity to institute policy changes that directly violate these durable beliefs, and thus
require  leaders  to  alter  their  goals  and/or  the  means  used  to  achieve  them.  At  a
broader  level,  the  ongoing  presence  of  regime  opponents  affects  how  policies  and
institutions  change:  rather  than  expressing  the  pure  purposes  of the  ascendant
partisan  order,  political  change  almost  always  “embodies  contradictory  purposes,
which provide for an ongoing, churning process of development” (Schickler 2001:267).
12  In short,  partisan regime development is  characterized not by the straightforward
conquest  of  the  previous  order  by a  new one,  but  by  protracted contention  between
competing regimes of unequal political strength. In what follows, I trace the historical
development  of  the  VRA,  linking  changes  in  statutory  text,  administrative
enforcement, and Supreme Court jurisprudence to shifts in the dynamics of contention
between the declining liberal Democratic order and the rising conservative Republican
regime.
 
The High Tide of Liberalism and the Enactment and
Early History of the VRA
13  The VRA was enacted during the apex of liberal Democratic influence in American
national politics (Skowronek 1997:325-60). President Lyndon Johnson had recently won
a  historic  victory  in  the  presidential  election  of  1964,  trouncing  conservative
Republican challenger Barry Goldwater by winning 61 percent of the popular vote and
more than 90 percent of  the Electoral  College ballots.  Led by a large contingent of
liberal members, the Democratic Party also held commanding majorities in the Senate
and  the  House  of  Representatives  (Carmines  and  Stimson  1989;  Valelly  2004:197).
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Meanwhile, a majority of the Supreme Court subscribed to a liberal judicial philosophy
highly sympathetic to the rights of racial minorities (Martin, Quinn, and Epstein 2005). 
14 As the Johnson administration transitioned into office following the shocking murder
of President John F. Kennedy, enactment of effective voting rights legislation was high
on the president’s agenda. Over the winter of 1964-1965, the president pressed Nicholas
Katzenbach (now serving as Attorney General) to “try to figure out…what I can do to
get 100 percent of people to vote,” even recommending that the attorney general study
whether  federal  postmasters  might  be  empowered  as  registrars  in  counties  where
white examiners refused to enroll black voters (Johnson 1964). The president’s interest
was  prompted  by  awareness  that  previous  legislative  efforts  to  secure  African
American voting rights had failed to overcome legal and extra-legal obstacles to voting
(Davidson 1992:13). The push for federal legislation was further catalyzed by the brutal
suppression of a carefully-staged voting rights protest in Selma, Alabama, by county
and state law enforcement officers, images of which were broadcasted via the nightly
news to millions of shocked viewers (Garrow 1978; Klarman 2004:440-41). “What the
public felt on Monday [the day after “Bloody Sunday”],” Harry McPherson privately
warned the president, “…was the deepest sense of outrage it has ever felt on the civil
rights question” (McPherson 1965).
15 Seizing the moment, the Johnson administration developed a sweeping voting rights
proposal. Not only did the administration’s plan call for the statutory elimination of
discriminatory literacy tests and the establishment of federal monitoring of southern
elections;  it  also  recommended  that  jurisdictions  with  low  voter  registration  and
turnout  and  histories  of  racial  discrimination  be  subjected  to  federal  review  and
“preclearance”  of  proposed  voting  changes  (Landsberg  2007:148-160).  Crucially,
whereas  previous  civil  rights  laws  had  required  onerous  case-by-case  litigation  of
discriminatory  voting  measures  after  they  had  been  adopted,  the  preclearance
proposal required covered states to demonstrate that proposed voting changes were
not discriminatory before these measures could be implemented (Karlan 2008:5).  To
build support for his recommendations, Johnson made a dramatic speech before a joint
session of Congress – viewed by more than 70 million people – in which he declared his
solidarity with civil rights activists and his intention to press for strong voting rights
reforms. “The Constitution says that no person shall be kept from voting because of his
race or his color,” Johnson (1965) asserted. “We have all sworn an oath before God to
support and to defend that Constitution. We must now act in obedience to that oath.”
16  With the images of  the Selma protest  still  vivid,  Democratic  congressional  leaders
“were  confident…that  President  Johnson’s  bipartisan  voting  rights  bill  would  be
enacted substantially as the President outlined it” (Kenworthy 1965; Robertson 1965).
The Democrats’  strong majorities in both houses of Congress, coupled with support
from  northern  liberal  Republicans,  permitted  swift  consideration  of  the
administration’s proposal. The VRA bill moved quickly through the legislative process,
and was subjected to only one major legislative change: whereas the administration’s
bill  permitted  the  federal  courts  to  preclear  proposed  voting  changes  in  covered
jurisdictions, Congress also endowed the DOJ with preclearance authority in order to
accelerate  the  review  process  (Posner  2006:90).  With  the  civil  rights  movement
reaching its crescendo, most representatives and senators seemed to “recogniz[e] the
inevitability of the bill’s triumph and the political wisdom of supporting it” (Keyssar
2000:211). In the end, the legislation was adopted by wide margins in both the House
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(328-74, with 37 southern Democrats voting in favor) and the Senate (79-18, with six
southern  Democrats  in  support)  (Graham  1990:173).  Congressional  enthusiasm  for
enhanced federal enforcement of minority voting rights was sufficient to overcome a
24-day filibuster of the legislation by racial conservatives.
17  As enacted, the VRA represented a sweeping expansion of the federal government’s
powers to enforce minority voting rights. Section 2 of the Act imposed a nationwide
prohibition on voting practices and procedures that discriminated on the basis of race
or color.  Sections 3 and 8 empowered the federal  courts and the Attorney General,
respectively, to assign federal observers to monitor the conduct of elections. Federal
preclearance of proposed voting changes – the most innovative and invasive feature of
the new law – was effectuated by Sections 4 and 5. Section 4 established criteria (the
coverage  formula)  for  determining  which  jurisdictions  were  subject  to  federal
preclearance, while Section 5 determined the procedures covered jurisdictions had to
follow in submitting proposed voting changes for federal approval. Other provisions of
the Act outlawed literacy tests as prerequisites to voting and directed the Attorney
General to challenge the constitutionality of the poll tax. 
18  While  enactment  of  the  VRA  represented  a  major  programmatic  victory  for  the
Democratic  Party,  it  ironically  undermined  the  political  foundations  of  the  party’s
coalition. As Carmines and Huckfeldt (1992:121) note, liberal Democrats’ strong stand in
favor of racial equality in 1964 and 1965 “tied the future of the Democratic Party to the
black electorate and racial liberalism.” This stance offended many racially-conservative
white southerners, who began to eschew their traditional allegiance to the Democratic
Party  by  voting  for  independent  –  and, increasingly,  Republican  –  candidates  for
political office, especially at the presidential level (Black and Black 2002; Valentino and
Sears 2005). While gradual, the decline of white support for the Democratic Party after
1965  fundamentally  weakened  the  party’s  electoral  coalition,  threatening  liberal
Democrats’ capacity to maintain and extend federal civil rights commitments (Lublin
2004:33-65; Layman et al 2010). 
19 Growing partisan conflict on racial issues was of considerable significance, because the
VRA  was  vulnerable  to  attack  by  opponents  of  vigorous  federal  voting  rights
enforcement.  Key  provisions  of  the  statute  were  ambiguous,  and  thus  subject  to
competing  interpretations.  Most  notably,  it  was  unclear  whether  Section  5’s
preclearance  provision  applied  only  to  laws  and  administrative  actions  directly
affecting the right to register and cast a ballot, or more broadly to changes that could
potentially dilute minority voting strength, such as gerrymandering or changes from
single-member to at-large elections (McCrary 2006:790-1). Even if Section 5 applied to a
broader range of voting changes – as the provision was interpreted after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Allen v. Board of Elections (1969) – the scope of this application was
unclear. Consequently, implementation of the law would inevitably be influenced by
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the text of the statute (as well as its Fourteenth
and  Fifteenth  Amendment  jurisprudence),  which  in  turn  was  highly  sensitive  to
changes  in  the  composition  of  the  Court.  This  meant  that  partisan  control  of  the
presidency - with its corresponding power to appoint justices to the Court - could play
a major role in shaping future interpretation and implementation of the law. 
20 The  Act’s  enforcement  mechanisms  were  also  vulnerable  to  politicization  by  the
executive  branch.  At  the  ground level,  vigorous  enforcement  required  a  consistent
willingness to enter voting rights controversies on the side of victims of discrimination.
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However, as King-Meadows (2011:9) reminds us, “while the Voting Rights Act of 1965
gives presidents a greater capacity to protect the franchise, the law cannot and does
not  grant  presidents  a  greater  inclination  [to  do  so].”  Presidents’  discretion  in
implementing the Act’s provisions meant that federal enforcement of minority voting
rights could become a handmaiden to a president’s broader political agenda, increasing
or decreasing in intensity depending on the president’s strategic objectives. 
21 More subtly, given the continued importance of the norm of racial equality, politicians
skeptical of vigorous federal voting rights enforcement had strong incentives to exploit
administrative and judicial strategies rather than legislative proposals as their primary
means  for  weakening  the  law.  Unlike  legislative  proposals  –  which  required
congressional  deliberation  and  thus  drew  extensive  public  and  media  scrutiny  –
administrative and judicial strategies promised critics opportunities to check the scope
of the Act without having to directly and publicly confront the norm of racial equality.
For  elected  officials  who  sought  to  circumscribe  federal  enforcement  without
appearing  to  violate  this  widely-held  principle,  this  made  these  “subterranean”
strategies especially appealing.
22 The importance of  presidents’  discretion in administering the law was immediately
made apparent. During Johnson’s tenure in office, the DOJ focused, with considerable
success, on registering African American voters and ensuring that they were able to
cast ballots in elections. Indeed, between 1965 and 1969, “roughly a million new voters
were  registered…bringing  African-American  registration  to  a  record  62  percent”
(Keyssar  2000:  212).  However,  fearing  backlash  from  southern  Democratic  senators
against vigorous implementation of preclearance, Johnson soft-pedaled enforcement of
Section 5, declining to issue regulatory guidance or exercise supervision over voting
rules in covered states (Ball et al 1982). In response, many covered jurisdictions simply
refused to comply with this provision: “from 1965 through 1968, neither Mississippi,
Louisiana,  nor  any  of  the  forty  counties  in  North  Carolina  subject  to  Section  5
submitted a single voting change for preclearance. Alabama submitted one in 1965, but
none in the next three years. Georgia made only one submission during the first three
years of the Act, and Virginia made none (McDonald 1983:63).”
23 Yet, at the same time, the liberal majority on the Supreme Court pushed ahead with
decisions that significantly bolstered the VRA’s prospects. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach
(1966), the Court sustained the central provisions of the VRA against claims that the Act
violated states’ rights and exceeded Congress’s remedial powers under the Fifteenth
Amendment. The Court’s alliance with the liberal Democratic regime was evident from
the text of its decision: indeed, one scholar of voting rights jurisprudence contends that
“a  cursory  reading  of  the  Court’s  opinion  discloses  an  obvious  affinity  with  the
[Johnson administration]’s position during the congressional hearings [on the VRA], a
fact that the Court did not attempt to hide” (Fuentes-Rohwer 2009:713). Then, in the
landmark Allen v. Board of Elections (1969) decision, the Court went well beyond the text
of  the  VRA  to  declare  that  Section  5  preclearance  covered  voting  changes  that
potentially diluted minority voting power as well as those that simply obstructed efforts
by non-whites to register and/or vote (MacCoon 1979). This meant that voting changes
such as switching from district to at-large elections, moving from elective to appointive
offices, changing the terms of elective offices, or increasing qualifications for office –
none of which actually denied African Americans the right to vote - were nonetheless
subject to preclearance. In reaching its decision, the Court again indicated its sympathy
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with the objectives of the liberal Democratic regime, adopting a generous reading of
the legislative history to arrive at the conclusion that Congress had always intended to
make voting changes threatening the dilution of minority voting strength subject to
preclearance (Kousser 2008: 685;  McCrary 2003: 689-70).  In truth, the Court ignored
important  evidence that  Congress  may not  have intended preclearance to  apply  to
cases of vote dilution (Eskridge 1991: 622). Allen dramatically expanded the potential
impact of the VRA by subjecting a much broader range of voting policies to federal
preclearance,  reinforcing  efforts  by  civil  rights  activists  and  their  congressional
supporters to protect minority voting rights by legislative means.
24 While  administrative  and  judicial  developments  had  cross-cutting  effects  during
Johnson’s tenure in office, they pointed to the crucial role that lower-profile political
decisions could have on the scope of voting rights enforcement. These developments
foreshadowed dynamics that would constitute federal voting rights policymaking in
the following decades.
 
Increasing Partisan Regime Competition and the
Political Development of the VRA in the 1970s
25  Soon after enactment of the VRA, white backlash against the civil rights movement,
controversy  over  American  involvement  in  the  Vietnam  War,  divisions  over  the
“counter-culture”,  and stagnating economic growth combined to weaken the liberal
Democratic  regime’s  grip  on  political  power.  In  the  1966  congressional  elections,
Democrats lost 4 seats in the Senate and 47 seats in the House. Then, in March 1968,
barely  three-and-a-half  years  after  his  stunning  presidential  victory,  Johnson
announced  that  he  would  not  seek  reelection  in  1968.  The  president’s  unexpected
abandonment  of  reelection  virtually  ensured  that  the  G.O.P.  would  win  the  White
House and make further gains in Congress. 
26 Having long dedicated himself to the quest for a Republican majority, Richard Nixon
perceived  that  the  time  was  ripe  for  a  significant  rightward  shift  in  the  tone  of
American national politics (Mason 2004: 23-30). During the 1968 campaign, he sought to
exploit white middle-class resentment toward groups – including African Americans
and other racial minorities - that were perceived by many whites as failing to conform
to mainstream American values (O’Reilly 1995: 279-285; Mendelberg 2001:95-98). Nixon
also  directly  challenged  federal  civil  rights  laws  such  as  the  VRA  which  focused
enforcement in the south, “stress[ing] his belief that the South had been discriminated
against too long, and that a century after the Civil War it was time to begin treating the
South  once  again  as  a  full-fledged  part  of  the  union  (Price  1977:200).”  With  the
Democratic Party in crisis, Nixon eked out a plurality in the popular vote (with 43.42
percent of the vote) in a three-way contest with Democratic standard-bearer Hubert
Humphrey and George Wallace’s American Independent candidacy. 
27 With victory in hand, Nixon took direct aim at the Voting Rights Act. However, rather
than seek outright repeal of the Act – which would have violated the norm of racial
equality  and exposed the administration to charges of  racism – Nixon undertook a
more subtle course “that would not destroy the Negro voter registration work done in
the South under the act but that would assuage the continuing anger of white Southern
politicians  who  believe  they  have  been  singled  out  for  special,  punitive  attention”
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(Reed 1969). To placate southern conservatives, Nixon proposed an amendment that
would  have  rescinded  federal  review  of  proposed  voting  changes  under  Section  5
(Kotlowski  2002:70).1 While  the  Nixon  administration  simultaneously  proposed  to
strengthen  other  features  of  the  law  –  in  particular,  by  banning  literacy  tests
nationwide, loosening state residency requirements for voting in presidential elections,
and authorizing the DOJ to send voting examiners to all parts of the nation (Kotlowski
2001:  81)  –  these  provisions  were  almost  certainly  calibrated  to  end  the  allegedly
“unfair” regional focus of the law and thereby reinforce the administration’s appeal
with southern whites (Panetta and Gall 1971:201-02). Not incidentally, Nixon’s proposal
to nationalize the DOJ’s examiners program would also have strained the Department’s
resources and thus likely made federal enforcement of minority voting rights more
difficult. In testimony before Congress, Attorney General John Mitchell stated that the
administration’s  proposal  required no new resources or personnel for enforcement,
apparently validating skeptics’ fears that Nixon’s plan was intended to undercut federal
voting rights enforcement (Graham 1990:356; Bay State Banner 1969).
28 Indeed,  the  racial  implications  of  Nixon’s  proposal  were  palpable  to  interested
observers, who lined up in in predictable fashion in favor of or against the proposal.
John  Gardner,  former  Secretary  of  Health,  Education,  and  Welfare  in  the  Johnson
administration and chairman of  the National  Urban Coalition,  charged that  Nixon’s
proposal would “very seriously cripple” the VRA (quoted in Finney 1970), while liberal
Republican William McCulloch of Maryland questioned why the administration’s plan
“sweep[s] broadly into those areas where the need is least and retreat[s] from those
areas  where  the  need  is  greatest”  (quoted  in  Lawson  1985:135).  In  contrast  Strom
Thurmond,  the arch-conservative Republican Senator from South Carolina who had
opposed the VRA in 1965, candidly declared that “If we have to have some voting rights
bill, I hope it would be the [Nixon] administration’s” (quoted in Weaver 1969).2
29  At the outset the prospects for Nixon’s proposal seemed bright. The plan passed in the
House by a 234-179 vote,  with Republican and southern Democratic representatives
voting overwhelmingly in favor of the legislation. However, rising awareness of the
threat  posed  by  Nixon’s  plan  spurred  civil  rights  activists  and  their  liberal
sympathizers  in  the  Senate  into  action.  With  the  blessing  of  majority  leader  Mike
Mansfield of Montana, liberal Democrats used their control of the Senate’s calendar to
delay  floor  consideration  of  Nixon’s  controversial  Supreme  Court  nominee,  Florida
jurist  Harrold  Carswell,  until  after  a  vote  on  the  VRA.  This  forced  conservative
southern senators - who desperately hoped to see Carswell confirmed and thus desired
a confirmation vote before liberal opposition overwhelmed his candidacy - to give up
plans to filibuster the VRA extension (Lawson 1985:145-46). As J. Francis Pohlhaus of
the NAACP later recalled, “[F]or once time worked in our favor, as some Senators who
would normally oppose us went along with the leadership on the bill and on cloture in
order to get a chance to vote for Carswell (Pohlhaus 1981).”
30 While racial conservatives – led by North Carolina Democrat Sam Ervin – continued
efforts to stymie progress on the reauthorization, a coalition of liberal senators from
both parties succeeded in moving a bill embodying their priorities to the Senate floor
(Chandler 1992:29). Freed from the specter of a southern filibuster, liberal Democratic
senators led by Philip Hart of Michigan, along with liberal colleagues in the GOP led by
Hugh  Scott  of  Pennsylvania,  restored  the  preclearance  clause  and  added  a  new
coverage formula that extended the VRA’s provisions to additional jurisdictions based
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on turnout in the 1968 presidential election. For good measure, the Senate bill added an
amendment  to  lower  the  voting  age  to  eighteen  (Garrow  1978:197).  The  Senate
legislation called for extending the law until 1975.
31  Liberal Democrats’ effective use of agenda control in the Senate turned the tables on
the Nixon administration and racial conservatives in the House. With the deadline for
reauthorizing the temporary provisions of the VRA now rapidly approaching in August
1970,  both the administration and the House needed to pass a bill  quickly to avoid
scuttling the landmark voting rights law and thereby creating the impression that they
were  overtly  hostile  to  African  Americans.  Passing  the  Senate  bill  was  their  only
realistic option: Senate liberals had warned their House colleagues that a conference
committee to reconcile conflicting House and Senate bills would encourage southern
senators to renew a filibuster and thereby prevent reauthorization of the law (Hunter
1970;  Mansfield  Sees  Filibuster  1970).  Moreover,  while  the  eighteen-year-old  voting
provision was controversial,  neither the president nor representatives in the House
wanted to convey antipathy to youth political participation when thousands of young
draftees were fighting and dying in Vietnam (Lawson 1985:153-55). Faced with the stark
choice  of  the  Senate  legislation  or  no  bill  at  all,  the  House  reversed  itself,  voting
224-183 to accept the Senate’s language (Graham 1990:361). 
32  President Nixon thus faced two options: vetoing the bill, and sticking to principles; or
accepting  the  legislation,  and  thereby  avoiding  the  enmity  of  young  and  minority
voters.  As  the  president  pondered  the  matter,  his  advisors  warned  that  “to  align
ourselves with the Thurmonds and Eastlands on [this issue] would invite the label of
blatant  racism” and thereby  have  a  “damaging  impact  on  our  capacity  to  govern”
(Price 1970).3 In the end, Nixon’s overweening fear of adverse public reaction led him to
swallow  both  his  opposition  to  “regional”  legislation  and  his  objections  to
enfranchisement of 18 year olds by statute and sign the Senate’s version of the VRA
extension into law. 
33  Nixon’s effort to dilute the VRA via statutory amendment had been turned aside by
liberal Democrats with the support of liberal Republicans,  who effectively exploited
Senate rules and the administration’s desire to avoid racial controversy to preserve
Section 5’s focus on the south while extending other provisions of the law nationwide.
However,  the legislative defeat  did not  bar  administration officials  from seeking to
“accomplish by administration what [they] were unable to do through legislation,” as
the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights charged in April 1971 (Aronson 1971). As he
wrote years later, Nixon was “determined to ensure that the young liberal lawyers in
the  CRD  [Civil  Rights  Division  of  the  DOJ]  would  be  prevented  from  running  wild
through the South enforcing compliance with extreme or punitive requirements they
had formulated in Washington, D.C.” (quoted in Ball et al 1982: 67). Attorney General
Mitchell, a chief architect of Nixon’s anti-civil rights 1968 campaign, was assigned the
task of making certain that federal “intrusion” in southern elections did not go too far.
Prior to the reauthorization of the law in 1970, as McDonald (1983: 63) notes, “Attorney
General  Mitchell  in  administering  Section  5  [had]  excluded  annexations  and
redistricting from coverage” in apparent contravention of the Allen decision; and had
“ruled that  only  those  changes  which the  federal  government  affirmatively  proved
discrimination were objectionable”, thereby reversing the burden of proof established
by the VRA in 1965. In 1971, under considerable pressure from liberal Democrats and
civil rights activists, the DOJ finally reversed course on these crucial matters and issued
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formal guidelines to routinize the Section 5 review process (Ball 1985:441). Nonetheless,
non-compliance with federal preclearance requirements remained a serious problem in
southern states. Government reports documented hundreds of cases between 1972 and
1975 in which either covered jurisdictions failed to submit voting changes to the DOJ
for  preclearance  or  covered  jurisdictions  implemented  voting  changes  despite
objections from the DOJ (Foster 1986: 22; McDonald 1983:65-66). To a degree, Nixon was
able  to  parlay  defeat  in  the  high-publicity  realm of  legislative  politics  into  success
through obscure administrative maneuvers.
34 Nixon also helped direct implementation of the VRA in a more conservative direction
through his appointments to the Supreme Court. As, top Nixon aide John Ehrlichman
explained, Nixon’s ultimate objective was to “change the domestic situation through
the creation of a long-lived strict-constructionist Supreme Court, composed of young
Justices  who would  sit  and rule  in  Nixon’s  own image”  (Ehrlichman 1982:  115).  As
advisor  and  eventual  Supreme  Court  appointee  William  H.  Rehnquist  candidly
explained, achieving this objective would inevitably entail the erosion of federal civil
rights protections, because “A judge who is a ’strict constructionist’ in constitutional
matters  will  generally  not  be  favorably  inclined  toward  claims  of  either  criminal
defendants or civil rights plaintiffs - the latter two groups having been the principal
beneficiaries of the Supreme Court’s ’broad constructionist’ reading of the Constitution
(Rehnquist 1969).”
35 While Nixon’s first two nominees to the Supreme Court – Clement Haynsworth and
Harrold Carswell – were rejected by the Senate due to financial improprieties and a
history of racist statements and actions, respectively, Nixon ultimately succeeded in
appointing three relatively conservative justices to the Court: Warren Burger (as chief
justice, replacing the staunch liberal Earl Warren), Lewis Powell (to replace moderate
liberal  Hugo  Black),  and  William  Rehnquist  (replacing  conservative  justice  John
Marshall Harlan II). All told, Nixon’s appointees moved the Court significantly to the
right, especially on racial matters (Epstein et al 2007).4 
36 These  appointees  provided  critical  votes  for  decisions  that  narrowed  the  scope  of
minority  voting  rights  in  the  1970s.  Most  importantly,  along  with  associate  justice
Potter Stewart, Nixon’s appointees provided the crucial votes in Beer v.  United States
(1976), the first major reversal in minority voting rights since enactment of the VRA in
1965 (Kousser 2008: 697). In Beer, the Court held that jurisdictions covered by Section 5
were  entitled  to  preclearance  of  proposed voting  changes  as  long  as  there  was  no
“retrogression” in minority voting strength – that is, as long as minority voters were
not left worse off after the change. According to the Beer standard, “changes that merely
perpetuate[d]  a  preexisting level  of  exclusion [were]  not objectionable for having a
discriminatory effect” (Karlan 2008:8, emphasis added), though changes motivated by a
discriminatory purpose could still be blocked under Section 5. The Court’s ruling in Beer 
was  extremely  controversial,  because  its  narrow  construction  of  “discriminatory
effects” had virtually no basis in either the text of the statute or the relevant legislative
history  (Rhodes  in  progress,  Chapter  2).  Nonetheless,  as  a  practical  matter,  Beer 
“restricted the range of voting changes that may be denied preclearance,” thus limiting
the  ability  of  the  DOJ  and  the  federal  courts  to  check  discriminatory  practices  by
covered state and local governments (Engstrom 1980). 
37 While Nixon’s administrative maneuvers and judicial appointments blunted the impact
of  the VRA,  the fact  that  the president had to resort  to  subterranean contrivances
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testified both to the power of the norm of racial equality and to the limited progress
made by conservatives in displacing liberal Democrats from their bastion of political
power  in  Congress.  The  Watergate  revelations  –  which  ultimately  forced  Nixon’s
resignation from the presidency - only strengthened the political position of liberal
Democrats  in  Congress,  ensuring  continuing  institutional  struggle  between
conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats for control of voting rights policy in
the  1970s. In  the  1974  congressional  elections,  held  in  the  immediate  aftermath of
Nixon’s resignation, liberal Democrats picked up 5 seats in the Senate (giving them a
61-39  majority)  and  48  seats  in  the  House  (increasing  their  advantage  to  291-144)
(Mieczkowski 2005:61-63; Zelizer 2004). 
38 The  infusion  of  liberal  Democrats  into  Congress  had  crucial  consequences  for  the
statutory development of  the VRA,  the temporary provisions of  which were up for
reauthorization again in 1975. Gerald Ford, who had assumed the presidency following
Nixon’s resignation from office, had previously exhibited little enthusiasm for vigorous
federal  protection  of  voting  rights,  having  served  as  the  point-man  for  the  Nixon
administration’s flaccid voting rights proposal in the House of Representatives (Finney
1969; Evans and Novak 1975b). In light of the liberals’ advance in Congress, however,
Ford  was  “eager  to  avoid  a  replay  of  the  conflicts  of  1969-1970”  that  had  marked
Nixon’s  punishing  foray  into  voting  rights  politics  (Thernstrom  1987:49).  Whereas
Nixon had sought, without success, to dilute the VRA through legislative amendment,
Ford attempted to preempt speculation about his intentions by advocating a simple
five-year extension of the law without major changes (Holsendolph 1975a; Ford Still
Backs 1975). 
39 Meanwhile, many liberal Democrats had their eyes on expanding the law’s reach to
ensure that language minority voters were protected in their right to vote. While the
VRA’s prohibitions against discrimination and ban on literacy tests were intended to
facilitate  voting  by  language  minority  voters,  they  did  not  address  other  problems
obstructing  voting  by  non-English  speakers,  such  as  lack  of  access  to  language-
appropriate  election materials  or  the absence of  language-specific  assistance at  the
polls  (Tucker  2009:55-56).  Believing  “federal  statutes  are  inadequate  to  resolve
problems encountered by Chicanos,” language minority activists sought to amend the
VRA  to  extend  preclearance  coverage  to  areas  with  concentrations  of  non-English
speakers  and  require  jurisdictions  to  provide  elections  materials  in  voters’  native
languages  (Meyer  1974).  Disturbed  by  contemporary  reports  by  the  United  States
Commission  on  Civil  Rights  which  “disclosed  widespread  discrimination  against…
minorities,  principally  Spanish-Americans”  (House  Unit  Moves  1975;  Hunter  1976:
254-57), liberal Democrats hastened to add these proposals to the VRA. Despite some
initial  concerns  that  incorporating  protections  for  language  minorities  could  spark
controversy and thereby jeopardize reauthorization of the law, African American civil
rights groups ultimately joined with Hispanic-American,  Native Alaskan, and Native
American advocates in support of the expanded legislation (Holsendolph 1975b). 
40 The House version of the legislation maintained the major provisions of the 1970 act,
while requiring jurisdictions in Texas, California, Colorado, and several other states to
submit  proposed voting changes  for  preclearance.  The House bill  also  provided for
bilingual  ballots  and  oral  voting  assistance  for  Spanish-speaking,  Asian,  Native
American,  and  Inuit  citizens.  The  legislation  thus  marked  a  major  progressive
expansion of the VRA, and hearkened back to the major civil rights bills of the 1960s.
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New York Democrat Herman Badillo, a major proponent of the bill, explained that “We
want to show that the spirit of the 1960’s still exists, and for everybody (Voting Rights
Act Wins Two Rounds 1975).”
41 Due to their commanding advantage in that chamber, liberal Democrats easily turned
aside  hostile  amendments  offered  by  conservative  Republicans  (which  would  have
eliminated provisions extending coverage to language-minority Americans and limited
the proposed permanent ban on literacy tests to five years) to bring the legislation to a
vote, where it was approved by an overwhelming 341-70 margin (Holsendolph 1975b;
Holsendolph 1975c). However, as the Washington Post noted, the House votes on voting
rights  legislation  in  1975  revealed  that  the  partisan  politics  of  voting  rights  had
changed dramatically  in  the  years  since  the  original  adoption  of  the  VRA in  1965:
“[Southern Democrats] had led the fierce fights against civil rights legislation in the
1960s,  but  this  time  it  was  Republicans…offering  the  softening  amendments”  that
would have weakened the law (Efforts to Ease Voting Rights Bill Rejected 1975). 
42 After a delay of more than a month – brought about by Senate Judiciary Committee
chairman  and  conservative  Mississippi  Democrat  James  Eastland’s  ill  health  and
absence from the Senate – the Senate took up the legislation in July 1975, less than a
month before the temporary provisions of the VRA were set to expire (Eastland Agrees
to  Move  1975).  At  this  point,  “Democratic  leaders…maintained  tight  parliamentary
control  of  debate”  (Rich  1975a)  in  an  effort  to  limit  the  impact  of  anticipated
conservative  resistance  to  the  renewal.  Liberal  Democratic  senators’  concerns  were
warranted:  an  alliance  of  southern  Democrats  and  conservative  Republicans  again
attempted  to  scuttle  the  legislation  with  dilatory  tactics  and  hostile  amendments
(Holsendolph 1975d). However, the liberal coalition prevailed, following the House in
pushing for the extension of Section 4 coverage to additional states and for additional
assistance for non-English speaking voters (Senate Taking Up 1975; Senate Rejects Bid
1975). 
43 Just as the Senate appeared to be completing work on the bill, however, President Ford
made a “surprise request…to expand the coverage of [Section 5 of] the law to all states”
(Madden  1975a).  Ford’s  appeal  breathed  new  life  into  a  moribund  amendment
originally  offered  by  conservative  Democratic  senator  John  Stennis  of  Mississippi
(Evans and Novak 1975a).5 While facially neutral, Ford’s proposal would have inevitably
weakened federal protection of minority voting rights. Not only would the proposal
have terminated Section 5’s focus on southern states, where voting rights violations
were most pronounced; it would also have strained the Department of Justice’s limited
resources and thereby enfeebled federal voting rights enforcement everywhere. Ford’s
unexpected intervention in the VRA renewal is thus best understood as contemporary
observers interpreted it – that is, as an echo of Nixon’s effort to appeal to aggrieved
whites while maintaining the appearance of support for minority voting rights and the
norm of racial equality (Evans and Novak 1975b). 
44 The  president’s  awkward  about-face  was  undoubtedly  the  product  of  political
calculation. Since the inauspicious beginning of his presidency, conservative activists
and party notables (most prominently, arch-conservative California governor Ronald
Reagan, who had opposed both the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of
1965) had harshly criticized Ford’s perceived moderation on economic and social issues
and  openly  discussed  challenging  his  re-nomination  as  the  party’s  presidential
candidate. As Ford’s 1976 campaign manager James Baker recalls, top administration
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officials “certainly were concerned about [the Reagan challenge] in May or June of ‘75”
– just as the VRA was wending its way through Congress (Baker 2010). Concerned that
Reagan  could  win  the  support  of  the  party’s  right  wing  and  thereby  block  his  re-
nomination,  Ford’s request appeared calibrated to reassure restive conservatives by
signaling he was “following Nixon’s civil rights footsteps (Evans and Novak 1975b).”
45 But  the  president’s  sudden  reversal  also  rendered  him  vulnerable  to  charges  of
abandonment  of  the  principle  of  racial  equality  for  crass  political  purposes.
Massachusetts  Democratic  senator  Edward  Kennedy  acidly  pronounced  that  Ford’s
request “in the final hours” of Senate consideration “[did] a great deal to confuse” the
administration’s  position  on  voting  rights  matters;  while  John  Tunney,  the  liberal
California Democrat managing the VRA reauthorization in the Senate,  charged that
Ford was “playing politics” with voting rights for the sake of his presidential prospects
(Madden 1975a). In the face of this onslaught the president retreated, declaring that
passage of Stennis’ proposal simply “took third place [in Ford’s list of priorities] behind
either  extension  for  five  years  or  passage  of  the  House  measure”  (quoted  in  Rich
1975b). With the president in hasty retreat, the Stennis amendment was defeated by a
38-58 vote; soon after, the Senate approved the VRA extension by a vote of 77 to 12
(Madden 1975b). The House then passed the Senate’s version of the legislation 346-56. A
chastened Ford signed the VRA extension into law prior to the statutory deadline (Ford
Signs Bill 1975). 
46 The struggle over voting rights legislation in 1975 represented a distant echo of the
1970  battle.  Whereas  Nixon  made  an  aggressive  play  for  southern  white  votes  by
circulating a proposal that would have substantially diluted African American voting
rights,  Ford only halfheartedly embraced the proposals  of  racial  conservatives,  and
retreated once it became obvious that the political costs of this stance were too high. In
the  end,  the  1975  revision  of  the  VRA  significantly  strengthened  the  federal
government’s role in protecting the voting rights of racial minorities: “in addition to
extending the provisions of the law for seven years [until 1982], the bill substantially
broaden[ed] the law by permanently prohibiting literacy tests and by bringing Spanish-
speaking Americans and other minorities under its coverage” (Ford Signs Bill 1975).
Crucially, a new Section 2 established a nationwide requirement that state and local
governments provide elections materials, such as “voting notices, forms, instructions,
assistance, or other materials of information relating to the electoral process, including
ballots”,  in  the  native  languages  of  minority  language  voters  (Boyd  and  Markman
1983:1351). Once again, the Democrats’ control of Congress, coupled with the enduring
strength  of  the  norm  of  racial  equality,  blocked  an  attempt  by  a  conservative
Republican president to dilute minority voting rights.
47 Yet  Ford’s  presidency offered other  avenues for  exerting conservative  influence on
federal voting rights enforcement. Unlike Nixon, Ford did not employ administrative
stratagems in an attempt to circumscribe implementation of the VRA.6 However, like
his  Republican predecessor,  Ford  was  committed  to  appointing  conservative  judges
who,  in  his  words,  would  support  Chief  Justice  Warren Burger’s  attempts  “to  limit
federal jurisdiction and let state courts make more judgments themselves” (quoted in
Abraham 1999:276). Granted the opportunity to appoint a justice to the Supreme Court
by  the  retirement  of  staunch  liberal  William  O.  Douglas,  Ford  selected  John  Paul
Stevens,  who  was  then  a  judge  on  the  Seventh  Circuit.  While  Stevens  would  later
become a mainstay of the Court’s liberal wing, in the 1970s he amassed a moderately
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conservative  voting  record,  often  voting  with  the  bloc  comprised  of  Nixon’s
conservative appointees (Epstein, Martin, Quinn and Segal 2007:18). In the important
1980 Mobile v. Bolden case, Stevens sided with the Court’s conservative wing in deciding
that  Section  2  of  the  Voting  Rights  Act  –  which  ordered  a  nationwide  ban  on
discriminatory voting practices - only prohibited voting practices entailing purposeful
discrimination on the part of elected officials. In the case at hand, this meant that the
plaintiffs  could not successfully challenge a Mobile,  Alabama at-large voting system
simply  because  no  African  American  candidate  had  been  elected  under  it.  More
broadly,  the decision was widely viewed as foreclosing the possibility that minority
groups could successfully challenge a policy or practice under Section 2 on the grounds
that it had a racially disparate impact on the voting power of minority voters, absent
additional evidence of intentional discrimination (Boyd and Markman 1983:1354).7 
48 All in all, the Nixon-Ford era heralded an important shift in the politics of voting rights,
brought  about  by  broader  developments  in  the  structure  of  conflict  between  the
nation’s  partisan  regimes.  Between  1968  and  1976,  Republicans  enjoyed  a  level  of
success in presidential politics that they had been denied since the election of 1960.
However,  these  gains  were  not  matched in  the  congressional  arena;  in  fact,  liberal
Democrats’ influence in Congress actually increased in the latter part of the decade.
Faced with staunch opposition, neither Nixon nor Ford was willing to violate the norm
of  racial  equality  through  a  frontal  assault  on  the  Act.  Instead,  both  proposed
amendments that – while racially neutral on their face – would have watered down
enforcement  of  minority  voting  rights.  When  these  efforts  proved  too  politically
controversial, both Nixon and Ford backed down. However, both presidents employed
subterranean administrative maneuvers and judicial appointments – which were less
visible to the public and thus less politically risky - to constrain implementation of the
law. 
49 This configuration of partisan and institutional conflict gave rise to a pattern of divided
development in voting rights policymaking,  in which the statutory text of  the VRA
became increasingly liberal and inclusive, even while administrative implementation
and voting rights jurisprudence moved in a noticeably more conservative direction.
This  dynamic  intensified  during  the  1980s  and  early  1990s,  when  two  stalwart
conservative Republican presidents clashed with a Congress still dominated by liberal
Democrats. 
 
The Reagan “Revolution” and the Politics of Voting
Rights in the Reagan, Bush I, and Clinton Eras
50  The 1980 election campaign witnessed a major struggle over the future of American
public policy. Whereas Democratic standard-bearer Jimmy Carter promised to uphold
most of the  commitments  of  the  liberal  Democratic  regime,  Republican  challenger
Ronald Reagan issued a fundamental  challenge to the legacies of  the New Deal and
Great  Society  (Skowronek  1997:409-29).  In  addition  to  questioning  core  Democratic
commitments in the areas of economic regulation and social welfare, Reagan cast a
skeptical eye on federal civil rights laws. In the realm of voting rights, Reagan issued
specific proposals that seemed calibrated to weaken the VRA without running afoul of
the norm of racial equality.  Echoing Ford’s 1975 recommendation, Reagan proposed
that  Section  5’s  preclearance  requirement  be  extended  to  all  fifty  states  (Wolters
Competing Partisan Regimes and the Transformation of the Voting Rights Act, 1...
Transatlantica, 1 | 2015
15
1996:29-30), even though it was almost certain that this would have stretched the DOJ’s
modest resources and thereby eroded federal voting rights enforcement, especially in
southern states. 
51 In the election, Reagan won an impressive victory, garnering a solid 50.5 percent of the
popular vote and 489 Electoral College votes. The Republican Party also won control of
the Senate for the first time in three decades, and achieved significant gains in the
House of Representatives. The election thus seemed to herald a major shift in federal
voting  rights  policy.  Indeed,  just  after  the  1980  election  ballots  had  been counted,
Senator Thurmond – the incoming chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, with
jurisdiction over the VRA – announced that he “favored repeal or revision of the Voting
Rights  Act  to  remove  Federal  control  over  local  affairs”  (Pear  1981a).  “[T]here  are
people who do not support  the Voting Rights Act,”  warned Walter E.  Fountroy,  DC
Delegate to Congress and Chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus in a letter to the
CBC’s supporters. “Those who oppose the Act are organizing Now to convince Congress
to weaken the Act so it will be ineffective” (Fauntroy 1981). 
52 In the end, however, the politics of the VRA extension echoed the battles of 1970 and
1975.  Liberal  Democrats  and  their  civil  rights  allies  again  turned  aside  a  major
legislative effort to weaken the VRA, and secured a 25-year extension of the law that
significantly strengthened its protection of minority voting rights. Liberal Democrats’
surprising victory had its roots in the impressive civil rights counter-mobilization to
Mobile v. Bolden. Fearing that the decision – coupled with Reagan’s election – sounded
the death knell of vigorous federal enforcement of minority voting rights, major civil
rights organizations engaged in an unprecedented organizational mobilization in order
to maximize their influence on the reauthorization of the Act. Their primary objectives
were  to  reauthorize  the  Act’s  preclearance  provisions  and  establish  new  statutory
language  that  clearly  prohibited  election  rules  and regulations  with  discriminatory
effects  (Pear  1981a).  Just  weeks  after  Reagan’s  inauguration,  civil  rights  advocates
began “devising strategy, lobbying legislators, and drafting a bill in anticipation of a
long  and  difficult  struggle”  (Pear  1981b;  Weinraub  1981).  As  Boyd  and  Markman
(1983:1351-52) report: 
The Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, to which 165 organizations belonged,
hired  its  first  full-time  executive  director  in  preparation  for  the  legislative
campaign which lay ahead. Moreover, elements of the Leadership Conference, most
notably the National Urban League, began to mobilize their local affiliates for the
purpose of contacting congressional offices in affected states and applying political
and media pressure designed to achieve a voting majority on the House and Senate
floors…The NEA [National Education Association] organized mailings to two contact
members in each of the country’s 435 congressional districts, and the NAACP set up
telephone banks so that local members could notify their representatives of their
feelings.
53 In Congress, Democratic Senators Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts and Daniel Patrick
Moynihan of New York, along with Representatives Peter Rodino of New Jersey and Don
Edwards of California, took up this agenda, “fighting hard to extend the existing law”
(Ball 1981). 
54 Meanwhile,  despite  Republicans’  impressive  gains  in  the  elections,  conservative
opposition to the VRA suffered from extreme disorganization. In truth, no Republican
wanted  to  take  the  lead  on  the  matter,  because  (as  presidential  aides  warned  top
Reagan advisor Edwin Meese) “[e]veryone agrees that there is no way the Republicans
Competing Partisan Regimes and the Transformation of the Voting Rights Act, 1...
Transatlantica, 1 | 2015
16
can win on this issue…it is more of a concern to blacks than it is to whites” (Thomas
1981). The Reagan administration adopted a official position of silence on the matter,
passing  the  buck  to  the  DOJ  to  conduct  a  comprehensive  study  of  the  Act.  While
Reagan’s request was likely intended to slow progress on the reauthorization, it left
conservative  opponents  of  the  VRA  in  Congress  bereft  of  presidential  leadership
(Extending Voting Rights 1981). 
55 In an effort to fill the void, conservative Republican congressman Henry Hyde of Illinois
developed a bill in which individuals or the DOJ would have to bring suit in federal
court  in  order  to  initiate  preclearance  against  covered  jurisdictions  (Boyd  and
Markman 1983:1357).  In effect,  Hyde’s  proposal  would have reversed the burden of
proof under Section 5 so that “localities that wanted to change voting policies would no
longer  have  to  prove  that  changes  were  not  discriminatory;  instead,  complaining
parties  would  have  to  prove  they  were”  (Wolters  1996:30;  Pear  1981a).  However,
impressed (or cowed) by committee hearings “at which dozens of witnesses testified
that there was a need to retain the law in basically its present form” (Pear 1981c), Hyde
backed  down,  declaring  his  support  for  administrative  preclearance,  albeit  with  a
provision to allow jurisdictions with histories of good behavior to “bail out” of coverage
(Boyd and Markman 1983:1368). 
56 The Democrats’ continued control of the House, the tireless lobbying of the civil rights
organizations,  and the disorganization of  Republican opposition led to passage of  a
strong VRA renewal bill in that chamber by a vote of 389-24. Not only did the House bill
reauthorize all of the law’s existing provisions, it also included a very strict bailout
procedure and required all  bailout  proceedings  to  be  heard in  the Washington,  DC
federal circuit court, which was widely believed to be especially hospitable to voting
rights claims (Roberts 1981). Additionally, as civil rights leaders had sought, the House
bill restored the standard –disavowed by the Supreme Court in Mobile v. Bolden – that
minority  voters  could  challenge  voting  policies  and  practices  with  discriminatory
effects  under  Section  2  of  the  VRA  (Pear  1981d;  Pear  1981e).  However,  the
reauthorization faced stronger headwinds in the Senate, where Republicans held the
majority.  In  that  chamber,  many  Republicans,  including  Thurmond,  Jesse  Helms  of
South  Carolina,  and  Orrin  Hatch  of  Utah,  opposed  both  the  strong  preclearance
requirement under Section 5  and the “effects”  standard for  proving discrimination
under Section 2 adopted by the House (Pear 1981f). These efforts were given a boost
when the president belatedly announced his support for lenient bailout proceedings
and restrictive Section 2 language (Stuart 1981; Holsendolph 1981). Led by controversial
assistant  attorney  general  for  civil  rights  William  Bradford  Reynolds,  Reagan
administration officials mounted a vigorous campaign against any legislative changes
that would have overruled Mobile v. Bolden (Days 1984: 337). 
57 However, the success of liberal Democrats and civil rights activists in passing a strong
bill in the House – coupled with heavy lobbying and public relations efforts by civil
rights activists (Pear 1981g) – blunted the impact of conservative Republican resistance
in the Senate. As presidential aides reiterated, fighting against the VRA in Congress had
become a losing proposition:
…regardless of the intentions on how the issue should be phrased when presented
to Congress in particular and the public in general, the issue will nonetheless be
debated on the level of abridging and abusing someone’s right to vote, rather than
the administrative arguments that  favor eliminating the temporary provisions…
[T]he issue is going to continue to be one of extreme sensitivity” (Wirthlin 1981).
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58 Faced with withering criticism from civil rights activists, which was heavily covered in
the press,  Reagan administration officials  felt  compelled to  reaffirm in public  their
commitment to equal voting rights (Pear 1982a). 
59 In a bid to “save the Republican Party” (in the words of one of his aides) from the
political  fallout  that  would  accompany  GOP  obstruction  of  the  renewal,  Kansas
Republican Senator Robert Dole proposed a VRA extension bill that generally mirrored
the  House  legislation  while  clarifying  the  statutory  definition  of  “discriminatory
effects” in Section 2 (Pear 1982b). Perceiving that enactment of the Dole bill was the
only  way  for  the  Republican  Party  to  save  face  on  what  had  become  a  politically
embarrassing issue, the Reagan administration endorsed Dole’s compromise (McGrory
1982;  Roberts  1982).  With  that,  conservative  opposition  to  the  VRA  in  the  Senate
collapsed, and the 1982 extension passed swiftly through the Senate on a 85-8 vote
(Helms Still Stalls Rights Bill 1982). 
60 The  1982  legislative  battle  over  extension  of  the  VRA  thus  bore  considerable
resemblance to the struggles of 1970 and 1975, respectively. As in the previous two
cases, a Republican president had sought to uphold the norm of racial equality in his
public rhetoric, while supporting changes that would have had the practical effect of
weakening federal  voting rights  enforcement.  Republicans  in  Congress  had initially
flocked to this banner, transforming the president’s proposals into statutory language
that  would  have  circumscribed  the  preclearance  process  and weakened civil  rights
activists’ leverage in voting litigation. Again, however, staunch Democratic opposition
and Republican anxiety about violating the norm of racial equality ultimately dissuaded
the G.O.P. from following through with these initiatives via the legislative process. In
the end, Republicans endorsed a reauthorization that cut against virtually all of the
principles  they  had  expressed  during  the  early  months  of  the  debate.  Most
significantly,  under  the  1982  amendments  the  language  of  Section  2  effectively
overturned Mobile v. Bolden, prohibiting “state and local officials all over the country
from  using  any  voting  practice  or  procedure  that  results in  discrimination  against
blacks and other minorities” (Thornton 1982, emphasis added), regardless of whether
the discrimination was intentional.
61 However – and again, like Nixon and Ford – Reagan employed his administrative and
appointments  powers  in  ways  that  limited  the  impact  of  these  legislative  changes,
largely out of the view of the public and the media. There is some evidence that Section
5 enforcement slackened during Reagan’s tenure. Section 5 objections declined from an
average of 3.87 percent during the Nixon, Ford, and Carter presidencies to 1.02 percent
under  Reagan,  even  though  Reagan’s  presidency  coincided  with a  round  of
redistricting,  which  resulted  in  a  substantial  increase  in  the  number  of  Section  5
submissions.  The  DOJ’s  enforcement  decisions  sometimes  involved  clashes  between
high-ranking political appointees at DOJ, who were more skeptical of vigorous federal
enforcement, and career attorneys, who tended to favor a more rigorous application of
the law. For example, as Guinier (1989:407-408) reports, 
62 “Between  1981  and  1985,  there  were  at  least  thirty  instances  in  which  [William
Bradford] Reynolds [chief of the Civil Rights Division at DOJ] overruled staff attorneys
who urged him to object to a voting law change which they considered discriminatory.
The assistant attorney general unilaterally shifted “the advantage of time and inertia”
away from racial minorities to benefit instead white elected officials.” 
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63 In a dramatic departure from previous practice, Reagan administration officials also
attempted  –  without  success  –  to  challenge  provisions  of  the  VRA  in  court.  Most
significantly,  the  administration filed  an  amicus  brief  in  Thornburg  v.  Gingles  (1986)
urging the Supreme Court to adopt a narrow reading of Section 2’s new “discriminatory
effects” language (Days 1988: 1012). However, the Court rejected the administration’s
position, reaffirming the language of the 1982 reauthorization and paving the way for a
multitude of lawsuits alleging discriminatory effects in voting changes.8 
64 While the administration failed to induce the federal courts to adopt its cramped view
of the law in the short term, it succeeded in transforming the federal judiciary’s view of
voting rights matters in the long run. Like Nixon, Reagan viewed judicial appointments
as a powerful tool for advancing conservative Republican objectives, especially those
that  could  not  be  accomplished  by  legislative  or  administrative  means  (Ackerman
1988). The Reagan administration vetted potential nominees with unprecedented rigor,
in order to ensure that nominees shared the administration’s ambition, in the words of
Attorney General Edwin Meese, to “institutionalize the Reagan revolution so it can’t be
set aside no matter what happens in future presidential elections” (quoted in Busch
2001:41).  During  his  term  of  office,  Reagan  elevated  William  Rehnquist,  a  Nixon
appointee,  to  the  chief  justiceship  (replacing  the  conservative  Warren  Burger)  and
named  three  justices  to  the  Supreme  Court:  Sandra  Day  O’Connor  (replacing  the
conservative  Potter  Stewart),  Anthony  Kennedy  (replacing  the  conservative  Lewis
Powell), and Antonin Scalia (filling the seat vacated by Rehnquist) (Shull 1993:165).
Reagan’s  appointments  –  especially  the  appointment  of  Scalia  and the  elevation of
Rehnquist to the chief-justiceship – had the consequence of moving the Court further
to the right, especially on civil rights matters. 
65  Joined by Clarence Thomas (an appointee of Republican George H.W. Bush), Reagan’s
appointees advanced the Supreme Court’s voting rights jurisprudence further on the
conservative  course  charted  by  the  appointees  of  Nixon  and  Ford.  In  a  series  of
decisions in the 1990s – Shaw v. Reno (1993), Miller v. Johnson (1995), Shaw v. Hunt (1996),
and Bush v. Vera (1996) – the Court’s conservative majority sharply limited states’ use of
race as a consideration in the creation of legislative districts (Kousser 1999:366-455). In
these cases, the Court struck down state efforts to create legislative districts in which
African-Americans would comprise  a  majority  and thereby possess  opportunities  to
elected black representatives. With these decisions, the Court’s conservative members
profoundly altered the politics of redistricting, recasting it in the mold envisioned by
Reagan and his supporters. In particular, the elaboration of standing doctrine under
the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate novel claims of injury resulting from race-
conscious redistricting provided aggrieved whites with a powerful mechanism both to
challenge the gains in minority representation that had already occurred and preempt
the expansion of office-holding by citizens of color (Dow 1997). 
66 These decisions had profound consequences for voting rights enforcement. Since some
states  had sought  to  create  majority-minority  districts  as  a  way of  complying with
Section 2’s prohibition against discriminatory voting practices, the Court’s decisions
substantially  reduced  the  tools  available  to  states  that  sought  to  provide  minority
voters with the chance to elect candidates of their choice (Katz 2003:2374-83). Equally
important, because the Department of Justice under president Bill Clinton had sought
to leverage Section 5 to pressure states to adopt majority-minority districts, the Court’s
decisions  effectively  circumscribed the  federal  government’s  powers  to  enforce  the
Competing Partisan Regimes and the Transformation of the Voting Rights Act, 1...
Transatlantica, 1 | 2015
19
rights of African American, Latino, and Asian American voters. Although the Court did
allow consideration of race in redistricting decisions under limited circumstances – as
in Easley v. Cromartie (2001) – as a whole the cases raised major obstacles to state efforts
to create districts in which majorities or pluralities of minority citizens would have
substantial opportunities to elect representatives of color (Karlan 2001:1583-84). 
67 Then, in a series of decisions related to redistricting in Bossier Parish, Louisiana (Reno v.
Bossier Parish I (1997) and Reno v. Bossier Parish II (2000)), the Court made it markedly
more difficult for the DOJ to interpose objections to proposed voting changes under
Section 5. Bossier I held that the fact that a proposed voting change would likely deny or
abridge the right to vote under Section 2 of the VRA did not give the DOJ sufficient
cause to deny preclearance under Section 5 (Katz 2001: 1187-88). Under Bossier II, the
DOJ could no longer object to a proposed voting change simply because the proponents
of the change intended to discriminate against minority voters; instead, the DOJ could
only  object  if  it  found  evidence  that  proponents  of  the  change  intended  to  leave
minority voters even worse off than they were before (McCrary, Seaman, and Valelly
2006:303).  Thus,  just  as  the  Beer  decision  had  prohibited  the  DOJ  from  denying
preclearance on the grounds that a proposed change had discriminatory effects unless
the  effects  were  also  retrogressive,  so  did  Bossier  II  prohibit  the  DOJ  from denying
preclearance  on  the  grounds  that  a  proposed  change  advanced  discriminatory
intentions  unless  the  intentions  were  also  retrogressive  (Fuentes-Rohwer 2009:737).
The National Commission on the Voting Rights Act (2006:79) has suggested that Bossier
II  likely contributed  to  a  significant  decline  in  DOJ  objections  to  proposed  voting
changes in the 2000s. 
68  A  consideration  of  Reagan’s  record  on  voting  rights  matters  suggests  that  the
president waged a multifaceted campaign to reduce the scope of the federal role in
protecting minority voting rights – and minority civil rights in general – often losing in
the short term, but sowing the seeds for future victories. Crucially, Reagan’s greatest
achievements  occurred  in  venues  where  both  public  attention  and  political
accountability  were  lower,  thus  allowing the  president  to  advance his  conservative
agenda without subjecting his party’s reputation to excessive public censure.
69 Reagan’s successor,  George H.W. Bush, pursued a somewhat different tack. Whereas
Reagan was motivated by strong conservative convictions and relished his role as an
ideological  crusader,  Bush was  a  more  cautious  politician who sought  to  avoid  the
harsh ideological battles that he believed contributed to partisan polarization during
Reagan’s  tenure  in  office  (Mervin  1996).  Notably,  total  voting  rights  enforcement
activity  increased  significantly  during  Bush’s  tenure  in  office  (compared to  that  of
Reagan);  moreover,  during  the  final  years  of  his  presidency,  the  number  of  DOJ
objections  to  proposed  voting  changes  per  year  rose  to  historic  highs  (National
Commission  on  the  Voting  Rights  Act  2006:  Figures  1-2).  Bush  also  appeared
uncomfortable  with  the  scope  of  the  Supreme Court’s  conservative  drift  on  voting
rights  issues.  In  Pressley  v.  Etowah  County  (1992),  in  which  a  conservative  Court
ultimately ruled that changes in the budgetary authority of a county commission were
not  subject to  preclearance,  the  Bush  administration  sided  with  the  unsuccessful
African American plaintiffs (Greenhouse 1992). 
70  Perhaps unsurprisingly given his ideological ambivalence, Bush left a mixed legacy for
the Court’s voting rights jurisprudence. His first nominee to the Court, David Souter,
was widely viewed as a moderate at the time of his appointment (Yalof 1999:192). Over
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time, however, Souter drifted significantly to the left,  often voting with the Court’s
more liberal justices (Epstein, Martin, Quinn, and Segal 2007:18).  In contrast,  Bush’s
second nominee, Clarence Thomas, began his career on the Court as a conservative and
moved  further  to  the  right  over  time.  As  noted  above,  during  the  1990s  Thomas
consistently  joined  with  the  Court’s  other  conservatives  in  adopting  a  narrow
construction  both  of  the  text  of  the  VRA and of  Congress’s  powers  to  enforce  the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 
71  The 1992 election returned the presidency to the Democratic Party after a long hiatus.
While Democrats initially feared that Bill Clinton – an avowed “New Democrat”, would
soft-pedal  voting rights matters,  his  administration adopted a surprisingly vigorous
view of enforcement.9 Under Deval Patrick, Clinton’s appointee to lead the Civil Rights
Division, the Division strongly urged states to create majority-minority districts as a
way to increase the representation of African Americans and other racial minorities. As
observers later reported, “Aggressive redistricting, prompted by the aggressive actions
of  the  President,  the  Justice  Department,  and  Attorney  General  Janet  Reno  in
enforcement of the Voting Rights Act, resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of
Black members of  Congress,  especially  in the south during the early 1990’s” (Court
Strikes  Again  1997).  Additionally,  Clinton’s  DOJ  sided  with  defenders  of  majority-
minority districts in the major racial redistricting cases of the 1990s, leading the United
States Commission on Civil Rights (2001:55) to “commend the Clinton administration
for its efforts to uphold redistricting plans that ensure minority voting rights.” In the
end,  however,  the  Supreme  Court’s  wrongful  districting  rulings  hamstrung  these
efforts, limiting Clinton’s capacity to affect significant change via regulatory decision-
making. 
72  Considered together, the years between 1980 and 2000 – the “Age of Reagan” (Wilentz
2008) – witnessed intensifying tensions in federal voting rights policy, reinforcing a
pattern that had begun in the 1970s. On one hand, the text of the VRA was liberalized,
particularly through amendments that strengthened the language of Section 2. On the
other  hand,  administration  of  the  VRA  was  pushed  in  a  much  more  conservative
direction, primarily due to conservative Supreme Court opinions that sharply limited
the use of race in redistricting and significantly narrowed the scope of the DOJ’s powers
to  object  to  discriminatory  voting  changes.  More  generally,  the  Supreme  Court’s
increasingly  narrow  view  of  Congress’s  power  to  remedy  constitutional  violations
generated a string of precedents that seemed to raise questions about the continued
constitutionality  of  the  preclearance  provisions  of  the  Act.  This  curious  pattern  of
development was shaped by the dynamics of partisan regime competition during the
1980s and 1990s. Conservative Republicans sought to amend the text of the VRA in ways
that would likely have weakened federal enforcement of minority voting rights, but
these  efforts  were  rebuffed  by  liberal  Democrats  in  Congress.  Frustrated  by  liberal
Democrats’ lingering influence in Congress and wary of directly challenging the norm
of racial equality, conservative Republicans worked to check federal enforcement of
minority  voting  rights  through  administrative  actions  and  judicial  appointments,
which were less amenable to public scrutiny and thus carried reduced political risks.
Republicans’ long period of control of the presidency between 1981-1992 allowed them
to shift the Supreme Court’s voting rights jurisprudence (and, to a lesser extent, the
DOJ’s administrative enforcement) further to the right, thereby narrowing the practical
scope of the statute. 
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Bush II, Obama, and the Politics of Voting Rights from
the 2006 Renewal to the Shelby County Decision 
73  In the 2000s, the conservative Republican regime reached the apogee of its influence in
American politics.  With the election of Republican George W. Bush in 2000 and the
Republican recapture of the Senate in 2002, the party enjoyed unified control of the
federal government for the first time since before the New Deal. In 2004, the G.O.P.
further consolidated control of the federal government, enjoying a 55-45 advantage in
the  Senate  and  a  232-203  margin  the  House.  The  ascendance  of  the  conservative
Republican regime had important consequences for the development of the VRA. As in
previous episodes of voting rights policymaking, this development took on a divided
pattern, in which conservatives lost important legislative battles but won critical – and
perhaps decisive – victories in the administrative and judicial arenas. 
74  The story of the 2006 renewal of the Voting Rights Act resembled that of the 1982
reauthorization, and illustrated both the continuing power of liberal Democratic forces
in Congress and the lingering influence of the norm of racial equality. As in 1982, civil
rights activists  –  again fearful  that Republicans’  preponderant influence in national
politics could spell disaster for the VRA – organized a massive multi-year lobbying and
grassroots campaign in order to firm up support for the law (Lyman 2006). Civil rights
activists took advantage of the opportunity presented by public attention surrounding
the 40th anniversary of the law in 2005, developing a comprehensive political strategy
to “ensure that the public understands the importance of this historic legislation and
the  continued  need  to  ensure  that  the  right  to  vote  is  secured  for  all  Americans”
(Leadership Conference on Civil Rights 2005). Civil rights activists’ primary objective
was  to  extend  the  previous  version  of  the  VRA  and  incorporate  new  legislative
language overturning Bossier II and Georgia v. Ashcroft (2003), both of which narrowed
the conditions under which DOJ could deny preclearance. Notably, civil rights activists
did  not  contemplate  major  changes  to  Sections  4  and  5,  even  though  changing
geographical  patterns  of  discrimination  –  and  the  rightward  drift  of  the  Supreme
Court’s voting rights jurisprudence -raised significant questions about the adequacy of
these  provisions.  This  reflected  activists’  pragmatic  awareness  that  any  attempt  to
significantly update the bill would likely have encouraged Republicans to seize control
of the amendment process, to the detriment of efforts to reauthorize the VRA along
progressive lines (Persily 2007:194-95). 
75 The civil rights activists’ campaign to renew the VRA had important consequences for
the law’s reauthorization. The early start allowed them to enlist the support of House
Judiciary  chairman  and  staunch  VRA  supporter  James  Sensenbrenner  of  Wisconsin
before his scheduled departure from the chairmanship (Nather 2005). Hearings on the
VRA  organized  by  Sensenbrenner  and  voting  rights  point-man  Mel  Watt  of  North
Carolina  raised  national  attention  to  continuing  racial  inequities  in  voting  rights,
helped establish a documentary record of continuing discrimination against minority
voters, and placed conservative Republican critics of the VRA – always wary of directly
violating  the  norm  of  racial  equality  -  on  the  defensive.  As  Roger  Clegg  of  the
conservative Center for Equal Opportunity explained, “The Republicans know that if
they  question  the  wisdom  of  reauthorization  the  Democrats  will  relentlessly
demagogue them on the issue. They’ll be called racist and accused of wanting to turn
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back the clock on civil rights. The Republicans would really like to have this off the
table” (quoted in Lyman 2006). Edward Blum, the entrepreneurial conservative activist
who had spearheaded numerous challenges to the VRA, agreed, arguing: 
[A]part from a few courageous members of Congress, the Republican congressional
leadership,  cheered on by the Bush administration,  is  hell-bent on keeping [the
preclearance]  system  in  place.  Why?...Republicans  don’t  want  to  be  branded  as
hostile  to  minorities,  especially  just  months  from  an  election.  After  all,  every
American knows how important the VRA was in securing voting rights for Southern
blacks. And even though only Section 5 is up for reauthorization, Democrats will
claim Republicans want to ‘turn back the clock’ if they voice any doubts. Who wants
to rebut that charge? (Blum 2006)
76 Following the hearings,  Sensenbrenner and Watt drew on the proposals of the civil
rights community to develop a thoroughly progressive piece of legislation (Pildes 2007).
The most notable features of the bill extended Sections 4 and 5 for a 25-year period;
overturned  Bossier  II  and  Georgia  v.  Ashcroft;  and  extended  provisions  benefitting
language minority voters. The duo then presented the proposal to the Senate Judiciary
Committee.  Testifying  both  to  the  momentum  behind  the  bill  and  to  Senate
Republicans’  desire  to  appear  amenable  (at  least  in  public)  to  the  reauthorization,
Chairman  Arlen  Specter  committed  to  an  unusual  “joint  introduction,  bicameral
introduction” and to an expedited timetable for consideration of the bill  (quoted in
Tucker  2007:233).  The  apparent  bipartisan  concord  was  amplified  by  a  joint
Democratic-Republican press conference at which leaders from both parties pledged to
work  for  swift  renewal  of  the  law  (Yachnin  2006a).  While  Democrats  had  long
supported renewal of the VRA as a matter of principle, Republican leaders’ apparent
enthusiasm for the legislation was likely shaped by more practical considerations: as
the Washington Post reported, “Republican leaders…hoped that early action [on the VRA
renewal] would earn goodwill from minority voters as members of Congress head into a
brutally competitive fall campaign season” (quoted in Murray 2006). 
77 Despite  Republican  leaders’  desire  to  put  the  reauthorization  behind  them  in  the
interest of partisan expediency, backbenchers in the party refused to play along. Much
to  the  embarrassment  of  House  Republican  leaders,  members  of  the  rank-and-file
forced  the  leadership  to  delay  a  vote  on  the  reauthorization  (Yachnin  2006b).
Republican criticisms of the bill were twofold: that preclearance was unfair to southern
states  and  violated  traditional  principles  of  federalism;  and  that  the  provisions
benefiting language minorities encouraged voter fraud, discouraged immigrants from
learning English, and increased the costs of elections (Persily 2007:182). Steve King, a
representative of Iowa and the leader of the group, authored an angry letter to the
leadership  joined by  dozens  Republican  colleagues  decrying  the  tendency  of
multilingual ballots to “divide our country, increase the risk of voter error and fraud,
and burden local taxpayers” (King Applauds 2006).
78 Conservative Republican members demanded votes on amendments that would have
weakened the preclearance and language minority provisions (Yachnin 2006c). But the
delay proved politically damaging to the G.O.P. Congressional Democrats “seized the
chance to spotlight the rare public dissension in Republican ranks,” the Baltimore Sun
reported,  gleefully  pointing  to  Republican  leaders’  failure  to  win  GOP  backing  for
voting  rights  legislation  as  evidence  of  their  hypocritical  approach  to  civil  rights
matters  (Neuman  2006).  “You  have  someone  [Republican  Party  Chairman  Ken
Mehlman] stand up one day and say, ‘We’re going to make a major outreach to African-
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American voters,’ and the next day, you pull the Voting Rights Act from the floor,” Mel
Watt caustically remarked (quoted in Nagourney 2006). 
79 Public shaming of the G.O.P. by civil rights activists and Democratic politicians seem to
have had its intended effect on the behavior of Republican officials. Anxious to avoid
further embarrassment in the run-up to the 2006 elections, House Republican leaders
permitted  votes  on  four  amendments  they  believed would  fail  due  to  unanimous
Democratic  opposition  and  a  divided  Republican  vote.  All  four  amendments  were
defeated: however, three proposed amendments received support from a majority of
the Republican caucus, pointing to enduring Republican hostility to vigorous federal
voting  rights  enforcement  (Stern  2006a;  Stern  2006b).  Once  it  was  clear  that
conservative  efforts  to  weaken  the  legislation  were  destined  to  fail,  Republican
lawmakers belatedly joined with their Democratic colleagues in voting in favor of the
renewal. 
80 In the Senate, consideration of the bill was long delayed by conservative Republican
senators  who  opposed  the  bill  on  the  same  grounds  as  those  articulated  by  their
Republican  counterparts  in  the  House  (Tucker  2007:246-47).  However,  Republican
obstruction  gave  way  when  President  Bush  –  undoubtedly  seeking  to  avoid  the
appearance of GOP hostility to minority voting rights just before the 2006 elections –
called  for  immediate  enactment  of  the  House  bill  in  a  speech  before  the  NAACP
(Feldman 2006). Given that the president had previously exhibited little interest in the
legislation,  it  is  almost  certain  that  the  speech  reflected  a  tactical,  election-year
“exercise in bridge-building, intended partly to strengthen ties between Republicans
and  black  voters  and  partly  to  reassure  moderate  white  voters  with  a  message  of
reconciliation,” as  the New York Times  perceptively reported,  rather than a genuine
change of faith (Stolberg 2006). Nonetheless, Bush’s speech had a galvanizing effect on
Senate Republicans: the legislation was brought to a floor vote later the same day, and
passed the chamber 98-0. Bush signed the legislation “amid midterm election season
fanfare” in an elaborate Rose Garden ceremony a week later (Loven 2006). 
81 The 2006 reauthorization of the VRA renewed the provisions of the law for 25 years,
until  July  2031.  Importantly,  the  2006  renewal  directly  addressed the  Bossier  II  and 
Georgia v. Ashcroft decisions with language that made it easier for the DOJ to interpose
objections to proposed voting changes (Tucker 2007:220-22). Civil rights leaders thus
won an important victory, securing a bill that was probably the best they could have
attained under the political circumstances. However, the renewal failed to respond to
changing political circumstances that raised questions about the efficacy of existing
provisions,  thus  making  it  vulnerable  to  constitutional  challenge  by  conservative
groups. Since the Court was dominated by Reagan, Bush I, and Bush II nominees, such
challenges – which activists such as Edward Blum promised were forthcoming - were
likely to receive a favorable hearing. 
82 While conservative Republicans did not secure major changes to the VRA through the
legislative  process,  control  of  the  presidency  allowed  them  to  influence  the
administration  of  the  Act  by  other  means.  Bush  aggressively  exploited  his
administrative  and nominations  powers  to  circumscribe  voting  rights  enforcement,
providing further evidence that the party’s legislative support for the 2006 renewal was
more a matter of party reputation maintenance than of principled commitment. 
83 Through  his  appointments  policies,  Bush  sought  to  remake  the  Division  in  his
conservative  image.  This  entailed  implementing  an  extreme  version  of  the
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administrative politics practiced by the Reagan administration. The president granted
very  conservative  and  unrepentantly  partisan  figures  –  most  notably,  acting  Civil
Rights Division chief Bradley Schlozman and de facto Voting Section head Hans von
Spakovsky – extraordinary authority over the Division’s hiring and decision-making
processes. These appointees exploited these powers to stack the Division with a new
cadre of conservative lawyers “affiliated with conservative groups like the Federalist
Society,  the  Heritage  Foundation,  or  the  Republican  National  Lawyers  Association”
(Morris  2009),  going  so  far  as  to  violate  federal  civil  service  laws  prohibiting  the
consideration of ideology in hiring. The Division’s political leadership also altered long-
standing administrative procedures to increase their control over its business, giving
conservative  attorneys  important  cases,  ignoring  recommendations  from  liberal
staffers, and even transferring disfavored attorneys out of the Voting Section (Yeomans
2014; Eggen 2005; Kennedy 2008; Rich 2007). 
84 These  developments  had  enormous  consequences  for  the  Division’s  operations.
Especially after 2003, administration put the brakes on Section 2 enforcement: while
121 Section 2 matters were filed by the Voting Section between 2001 and 2003, only 41
additional cases were filed between 2004 and 2007 (GAO 2009: 68). But the preclearance
process bore the brunt of conservative Republican hostility toward vigorous federal
voting rights enforcement. Both the total number of preclearance objections (36) and
the proportion of objections relative to submissions (.0008) fell  precipitously during
Bush’s  first  five  years  in  office  compared  to  the  previous  decade  (356  and  .002,
respectively)  (Fuentes-Rohwer  and  Charles  2007:  517).  The  DOJ  also  adopted  an
extremely lenient preclearance policy that resulted in the approval  of  a  number of
highly  dubious  voting  changes.  For  example,  in  2001  the  DOJ  appears  to  have
collaborated with the Mississippi state Republican Party so that a redistricting plan
favoring  the  GOP  was  implemented  instead  of  an  alternative  plan  ordered  by  a
Mississippi state court (Liu 2009:83). Then, in 2003, the DOJ approved the State of Texas’
controversial  mid-decade  redistricting  plan  –  which  reduced  Latino  congressional
representation – despite the fact that career staff unanimously recommended that an
objection  be  interposed  (Posner  2006:14).  The  plan  was  later  struck  down  by  the
Supreme Court in LULAC v. Perry (2006). In 2005, the DOJ precleared stringent voter ID
requirements submitted by Arizona and Georgia, even though career staff warned that
the  requirements  would  likely  lead  to  the  disenfranchisement  of  minority  voters
(Karlan 2009:22). All told, the DOJ’s administration of Section 5 during Bush’s tenure
indicated  that  the  president  placed  a  relatively  low  priority  on  the  protection  of
minority voting rights. 
85  Bush also shaped administration of the VRA through his Supreme Court appointments.
Echoing the arguments of Republican presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan,
Bush  claimed  that  he  subscribed  to  a  “strict  constructionist”  interpretation  of  the
Constitution, and suggested that he sought “judges who would faithfully interpret the
Constitution, and not use the courts to invent laws or dictate social policy” (Bush 2008).
Like  his  conservative  Republican  predecessors,  Bush  aspired  to  use  judicial
appointments to institutionalize conservative activism in the judiciary for years, if not
decades,  to  come (Goldman,  Schiavoni,  and Slotnik  2009).  Bush’s  appointees  to  the
Court – John Roberts, replacing William Rehnquist as Chief Justice; and Samuel Alito,
replacing  Sandra  Day  O’Connor  –  further  advanced  the  Court’s  conservative  drift:
whereas Roberts was probably no more conservative than Rehnquist, Alito was more
predictably  conservative  than O’Connor  (Stearns  2008).  Importantly,  at  the  time of
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Roberts’ confirmation hearings substantial evidence emerged from Roberts’ tenure in
the Reagan DOJ suggesting that the future chief justice viewed the VRA – and especially
Section 2’s prohibition against voting practices with “discriminatory effects” – with
considerable skepticism (Smith, Goldstein, and Becker 2005; Serwer 2013). That Bush
appointed Roberts with full knowledge of this history suggests he anticipated Roberts
would advance this perspective on the Court, testifying to the president’s ambition to
use his appointments to advance his conservative voting rights agenda. 
86  Bush’s appointments to the Supreme Court further entrenched a conservative five-
vote majority on voting rights matters. Crucially, the 2008 and 2012 elections, which
witnessed the election and reelection of Democrat Barack Obama, did not disturb this
majority, pointing to the critical role played by conservative appointees in hemming in
the  progressive  thrust  of  the  legislative  language  of  the  VRA  long  after  their
presidential patrons had departed the political scene.10 Building on the momentum of
the conservative Rehnquist Court, the Roberts Court moved quickly to further limit the
scope of  the  Act.  First,  in  Bartlett  v.  Strickland  (2009)  the  Court  narrowly  construed
Section  2  by  deciding  that  “a  minority  group  must  be  capable  of  constituting  a
numerical  majority  of  the  voting-age  population  in  a  geographically  compact  area
before Section 2 requires the creation of an electoral district to prevent dilution of that
group’s  votes”  (Haygood  2010).  In  effect,  this  decision  further  limited  the
circumstances  under  which  minorities  could  successfully  press  for  a  minority
opportunity district under Section 2. 
87 Then, after warning in NAMUDNO v. Holder (2009) that the VRA’s preclearance regime
might  be  unconstitutional,  the  conservative  Court  majority  dealt  preclearance  a
potentially fatal blow in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder (2013), striking Section 4 on the
grounds that the coverage formula failed to take account of improvements in southern
race  relations.  Criticizing  Section  4’s  strong  focus  on  southern  states,  the  Court’s
majority flatly declared that “[d]egardless of how to look at the record [of southern
discrimination  against  minority  voters  today]…no  one  can  fairly  say  that  it  shows
anything  approaching  the  “pervasive,”  “flagrant,”  “widespread,”  and  “rampant”
discrimination that faced Congress in 1965, and that clearly distinguished the covered
jurisdictions  from  the  rest  of  the  Nation  at  that  time”  (Supreme  Court  2013:21).
Congress’s failure to develop a coverage formula that reflected the Court majority’s
view of contemporary racial realities “leaves us today with no choice but to declare
§4(b)  unconstitutional”  (Supreme  Court  2013:24).  By  removing  previously-covered
jurisdictions from federal scrutiny, the striking of Section 4 had the effect of rendering
Section  5  inoperable.  More  troubling,  the  Court’s  embellishment  of  federalism
principles  –  especially  the  doctrine  of  “equal  state  sovereignty”,  which  the  Court
interpreted  to  limit  disparate  treatment  of  states  under  federal  law  –  seemed
deliberately calibrated to restrain future congressional efforts to safeguard the voting
rights of racial and language minorities (Hasen 2014; Blacksher and Guinier 2014). 
88  The Obama administration decried the Court’s  decision,  and called on Congress to
work to renew the law. However, freed by Shelby County from the electoral imperative
to  acquiesce  to  the  extension  of  a  law  they  reviled,  congressional  Republicans
obstructed Democrat-led efforts to reinstate preclearance in 2014 and 2015. Meanwhile,
the  Obama  administration  attempted  to  use  other  sections  of  the  Act  to  block
previously-covered  states  from  adopting  restrictive  voting  regulations,  with  mixed
success. While the struggle over federal voting rights continues, Shelby County altered
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the balance of power in this conflict,  shifting the advantage to skeptics of vigorous
voting rights enforcement. 
 
Conclusion: Contending Partisan Regimes and the
Development of the Voting Rights Act
89  In finding Section 4’s coverage formula unconstitutional, the Supreme Court’s decision
in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder struck a serious – and quite likely decisive – blow to
the  VRA’s  preclearance  regime.  The decision  has  rightly  received  a  great  deal  of
attention  from  journalists  and  voting  rights  experts.  Viewed  from  the  longer
perspective of history, however, Shelby County is merely the most recent example of a
long chain of conservative voting rights decisions narrowing the scope of the VRA’s
progressive  textual  provisions  and  thereby  circumscribing  federal  enforcement  of
minority voting rights. From this perspective, Shelby County exacerbates, in dramatic
fashion,  the  tension  between  the  statute’s  progressive  text,  on  one  hand,  and
conservative statutory and constitutional interpretation, on the other, that has been
building since the mid-1970s. 
90  As I have argued in this article, the divided development of federal voting rights policy
over the past five decades reflects broader partisan struggles between a declining, but
institutionally  entrenched,  liberal  Democratic  partisan  regime  with  strong
commitment to minority voting rights and a rising conservative Republican partisan
regime  with  limited  commitment  to  minority  voting  rights.  As  conservative
Republicans  have  come  to  enjoy  greater  success  in  American  electoral  politics  –
especially at the presidential level - they have repeatedly sought legislative changes
that would have circumscribed federal protection of minority voting rights. However,
lingering  liberal  Democratic  influence  in  Congress,  combined  with  conservatives’
hesitance to directly challenge the norm of racial equality, have not only obstructed
such efforts, but actually promoted the legislative expansion of minority voting rights.
Conservative Republican presidents have thus sought to redirect implementation of the
VRA  through  administrative  and  (especially)  judicial  channels,  where  progress  on
conservative goals could be made without the same risk of public disapprobation. 
91 Over the course of several decades, conservative Republican presidents have succeeded
in remaking the Supreme Court, ensconcing a conservative majority with a cramped
view  of  federal  voting  rights  enforcement.  The  conservative  Court  majority  has
gradually narrowed the interpretation of both Section 2 and Section 5, blunting the
progressive  thrust  of  the  VRA’s  major  textual  provisions.  In  the  end,  federal
preclearance of proposed voting changes succumbed not to changing racial conditions
in the south, as the conservative Court majority in Shelby County maintained, but to
changing  partisan  and  ideological  conditions  on  the  Court  that  have  given  racial
conservatives the majority needed to accomplish long-cherished Republican objectives
via judicial means. More broadly, Republicans’ delegation to a conservative-led Court of
the responsibility for defanging the VRA helped protect Republican elected officials
from political backlash for weakening the law themselves.
92  A  major  question  in  American  politics  today  is  whether  the  nation’s  governing
institutions  are  up  to  the  task  of  designing  a  federal  voting  rights  policy  that
adequately  protects  the  rights  of  the  nation’s  racial  and  language  minorities  and 
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accurately  reflects  changing  patterns  of  voting  discrimination.  Without  a  prompt
renewal of the VRA, challenges to the voting rights of minority citizens are likely to
continue – if not intensify. 
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NOTES
1. If adopted, this proposal would have forced civil rights leaders and the DOJ to revert to the
expensive and time-consuming task of challenging each and every discriminatory voting change
in  court  after  it  had  been  adopted,  weakening  federal  capacity  to  block  unconstitutional
restrictions on voting rights (Kousser 2008:686).
2. Thurmond had first distinguished himself as a leading opponent of racial equality when he
bolted the Democratic Party in 1948 to run an independent “States Rights Democratic Party”
presidential campaign, in response to Democratic nominee Harry Truman’s outreach efforts with
African Americans. Since that time, Thurmond had remained an implacable opponent of federal
civil  rights  legislation,  even  switching  to  the  Republican  Party  in  protest  of  the  Democrats’
increasing support for civil rights. 
3. Price’s references are to senators Strom Thurmond of South Carolina and James Eastland of
Mississippi, two of the most racially conservative members of the Senate.
4. Harry Blackmun, Nixon’s fourth appointee, ended up disappointing conservatives by adopting
an unexpectedly liberal jurisprudence.
5. Stennis had voted against both Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and
thus was known as an avowed opponent of civil rights legislation. Ford’s apparent endorsement
of Stennis’ amendment thus seemed to indicate presidential approval of the Mississippi senator’s
transparently conservative purposes.
6. Ford’s  unwillingness  to  politicize  voting  rights  enforcement  likely  stemmed  from  his
perception that Nixon’s politicization of the executive branch contributed both to the Watergate
affair and to Nixon’s eventual downfall.
7. However, because the Court’s decision was based on its interpretation of the text of the statute
– rather than on its interpretation of provisions of the United States Constitution – the Mobile
decision was subject to repeal through the ordinary legislative process.
8. Notably,  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Court’s  decision,  the  administration  instituted  a  more
exacting reading of both Section 2 and Section 5: indeed, the DOJ began to interpose objections to
proposed voting changes under Section 5 if the changes violated Section 2 (Posner 2006:96)
9. However,  Clinton  abandoned  the  nomination  of  Lani  Guinier,  a  prominent  voting  rights
attorney, to lead the Civil Rights Division in reaction to vociferous Republican criticism of her
views on minority representation. 
Competing Partisan Regimes and the Transformation of the Voting Rights Act, 1...
Transatlantica, 1 | 2015
37
10. While Obama has had the opportunity to appoint two justices to the Supreme Court, these
appointees – Sonya Sotomayor (in 2009) and Elena Kagan (in 2010) – replaced relatively liberal
justices  David  Souter  and  John  Paul  Stevens,  respectively,  and  thus  had  little  restraining
influence on the Court’s rightward march.
ABSTRACTS
On  June  26,  2013,  the  Supreme  Court  struck  down  the  coverage  formula  enabling  federal
preclearance of  proposed voting changes in jurisdictions with documented histories of  racial
discrimination.  This  paper interprets  this  event  as  the most  recent  symptom of  a  long-term
partisan and institutional struggle over the scope of federal voting rights enforcement. Lingering
liberal Democratic influence in Congress, coupled with conservatives’ fears of violating the norm
of racial  equality,  obstructed Republican diminution of federal  voting rights enforcement via
legislation.  Consequently,  Republicans  turned  to  lower-profile  administrative  and  especially
judicial  venues,  which  offered  conservative  elected  officials  chances  to  circumscribe  voting
rights enforcement while simultaneously maintaining a public facade of support for the norm of
racial equality. Over time, this dynamic has yielded a situation in which the Court has come to
serve as the judicial arm of the Republican Party, at least in the realm of voting rights.
Le  26  juin  2013  la  cour  suprême  frappa  d’inconstitutionnalité  la  formule  permettant  de
déterminer  quelles  juridictions  s’étaient  rendues  coupables  de  discriminations  historiques  et
devaient soumettre tout changement de leurs procédures électorales à la tutelle de l’Etat fédéral.
Cet  article  présente  cet  événement  comme  la  manifestation  la  plus  récente  d’une  lutte
institutionnelle  et  partisane  centrée  sur  l’application  du  droit  de  vote.  La  persistance  de
l’influence de l’aile gauche du parti démocrate au Congrès, ainsi que la peur des républicains
d’enfreindre la norme d’égalité raciale, empêchèrent les conservateurs d’affaiblir la protection
du droit de vote par la voie législative. Par conséquent, les républicains se sont tournés vers les
voies administratives et judiciaires, plus discrètes, qui leur permirent d’affaiblir l’application du
droit de vote tout en maintenant un discours public de respect de l’égalité raciale. Au cours du
temps, cette dynamique créa une situation dans laquelle la Cour Suprême est devenue le bras
armé du Party républicain au moins dans le domaine du droit de vote.
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